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Nineteenth-Century Music? 
Ian Bent 
In recent years, the word "hermeneutics" has re-entered the 
language of discourse about music-re-entered, that is, in German, after 
an absence of perhaps forty years; but really entered for the first time 
in the English language. In German, Carl Dahlhaus's definition in 
Foundations of Music History of 1967 reawakened our awareness, and 
a 1975 volume of essays on the subject under his editorship reinforced 
that initiative. 1 In English, the driving force for an exploration of 
musical hermeneutics was, of course, Joseph Kerman's polemic on 
criticism, supported especially by the writings of Anthony Newcomb; 
and the round table at the Bologna Conference of the International 
Musicological Society in 1987, entitled "Music Criticism between 
Technical and Hermeneutic Analysis," was a symbolic moment in the 
evaluation of hermeneutics for musical purposes. 2 Others who have 
lCarl Dahlhaus, Grundlagen der Musikgeschichte (Cologne: Hans Gerig, 1967), 
trans. J. B. Robinson as Foundations of Music History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), 4-5, 71-85 passim; Beitriige zur musikalischen Hermeneutik, 
ed. Carl Dahlhaus, Studien zur Musikgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts, vol. 43 
(Regensburg: Bosse, 1975). 
2J oseph Kerman's initiative started with his "A Profile for Musicology," J oumal of 
the American Musicological Society 18 (1965): 61-69, and continued in many places, 
including his Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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contributed to that evaluation directly or indirectly include Peter Kivy, 
Edward Cone, Fred Maus, and Marion Guck; but a music-hermeneutic 
practice has been formulated and put to the test on music only in the 
past five years in the work of Lawrence Kramer, and on texts about 
music still more recently by Gary Tomlinson. 3 
My own treatment of the field, in volume 2 of my Music Analysis 
in the Nineteenth Century, gives a historical account of general 
hermeneutics and seeks to illustrate how this was put into practice in 
writing about music. 4 The present papers goes beyond that, attempting 
to demonstrate more tangibly the working of hermeneutics in the early 
nineteenth century. My purpose is to isolate the hermeneutics of its 
earliest practitioner, Friedrich Schleiermacher, unfiltered by the 
subsequent hermeneutics of Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer and others, 
and to consider its relevance to music by looking at one particular and 
celebrated piece of writing about music, namely E. T. A. Hoffmann's 
review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony.6 
University Press, 1986). Proceedings of the round table appear in Aui del XlV congresso 
della societa internazionale di musicologia ... : vol. 1, Round Tables (Turin: EDT, 
1990), 645-90. 
3Lawrence Kramer, Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), 1-20 passim; Gary Tomlinson, Music in Renaissance Magic: 
Toward a Historiography of Others (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), 1-43, 
247-52 passim. 
4Ian Bent, ed., Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), vol. 1, Fugue, Form and Style; vol. 2, Hermeneutic 
Approaches. 
5This paper was first presented at the International Conference on Nineteenth-Century 
Music at the University of Surrey, Guildford, England, on July 17, 1994. 
6First published in Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung 12 (1809/10): cols. 630-42, 
652-59; German edition Friedrich Schnapp, E. T. A. Hoffmann: Schriften zur Musik: 
Aujstitze und Rezensionen (Munich: Winkler-Verlag, 1977), 34-51; Eng. trans. in E. T. 
A. Hoffmann's Musical Writings: "Kreisleriana, " "The Poet and the Composer, " Music 
Criticism, ed. David Charlton, trans. Martyn Clarke (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 234-51, reproduced with modifications and commentary in Bent, Music 
Analysis in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 2, 141-60; see also pp. 123-24. 
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Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics: The Practice 
Who, then, was Friedrich Schleiermacher? A contemporary of 
Hegel, he was a theologian and a philosopher. Educated by the 
Moravian pietists and later schooled in the philosophy of Kant, he was 
powerfully influenced by the events of the French Revolution. His 
theology was already tending towards the liberal when, in 1797, he was 
introduced to the circle of August and Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis, 
Wackenroder, and other literary figures of the Romantic movement. 
Indeed, Friedrich Schlegel lived as a tenant at his house for two years, 
and the two became close friends and collaborators. Schleiermacher is 
even the basis for one of the characters in Schlegel's fragmentary novel 
Lucinde, and Schleiermacher himself wrote a defense of the novel. 7 
His first theological work, from 1799, On Religion: Speeches to Its 
Cultured Despisers, 8 diverged from rational Enlightenment theology by 
placing high value on experience and revelation. This book, together 
with later ones, 9 established him as the leading Protestant German 
theologian of his day and the father of modern Protestant theology. 
Around 1797, he and Friedrich Schlegel conceived a plan to translate 
all of Plato's works into German. They worked on it together until 
1804, when the project caused the two men to fall out. Schleiermacher 
then continued the work, writing the introductions to the whole and to 
7Friedrich Sch1eiermacher, Vertraute Briefe aber Friedrich Schlegels Lucinde (1800), 
ed. K. Gutzow (1835), ed. W. Hirschberg (Weimar: Martin Biewald, 1920). A useful 
biography is Martin Redeker, Schleiermacher: Leben und Werk (Berlin: Gruyter, 1968), 
trans. John Wallhausser as Schleiermacher: Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1973). 
8Idem, Uber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Veriichtem (Berlin: 
Unger, 1799), trans. Richard Crouter as On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
9Idem, Der christliche Glaube (Berlin: Reimer, 1821-22), trans. Hugh Ross 
Mackintosh and James Stuart Stewart as The Christian Faith (Edinburgh: Clark, 1928; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976); Das Leben Jesu: Vorlesungen, ed. K. A. Rtitenik 
(Berlin: Reimer, 1864), ed. and with an introduction by Jack C. Verheyden, trans. S. 
Maclean Gilmour as The Life of Jesus (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975). 
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each individual dialogue. All of volumes 1 and 2, and part of volume 
3, achieved publication before his death. Thereafter, the work remained 
incomplete. 10 
We can see Schleiermacher's hermeneutics at work by studying his 
introductions to Plato's Dialogues, for they have long been held up as 
exemplary models of hermeneutic inquiry. For example, the 
philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey draws attention to the introduction to The 
Republic as follows: 
[Schleiermacher] started with a survey of the structure, 
comparable to a superficial reading, tentatively grasped the 
whole context, illuminated the difficulties, and halted 
thoughtfully at all those passages which afforded insight into the 
composition. Only then did the interpretation proper begin.ll 
In particular, I should like to look at his introduction to the dialogue 
entitled the Sophist. The Sophist, not one of the more popular of Plato's 
Dialogues, may not possess the drama of, say, the Phaedo, in which 
we see the final hours and death of Socrates, or the Meno, in which a 
slave is cross-questioned in a demonstration of the existence of Platonic 
ideas or forms. Nevertheless, it is an important dialogue-one of three 
in which, broadly stated, Plato investigates the nature of philosophy. 
Moreover, these are the only three of all of Plato's Dialogues that refer 
lOpriedrich Schleiermacher, ed., Platons Werke (Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung, 
1804-28), vol. 1, pt. 1 (1804); vol. 1, pt. 2 (1805); vol. 2, pt. 1 (1805); vol. 2, pt. 2 
(1807); vol. 2, pt. 3 (1809); vol. 3, pt. 1 (1828) [unfinished]; 2nd ed. (1817-28), trans. 
William Dobson as Schleiermacher's Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato (Cambridge: 
Deighton; London: John William Parker, 1836). 
llLecture to the Prussian Academy of Sciences, 1896/97, published as "Die 
Entstehung der Hermeneutik," in Philosophische Abhandlungen, Christoph Sigwart zu 
seinem 70. Geburtstag 28 Miirz 1900 gewidmet (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1900), 185-202; 
Gesammelte Schriften (Leipzig and Berlin: Teubner, 1924),5:317-31; trans. Hans Peter 
Rickman in W. Dilthey: Selected Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1976), 246-63. The quoted passage is on p. 259. 
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to one another, and in addition, they share a common group of 
characters. 12 Therefore they possess an overt relationship. The three 
are: 
Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman 
What is more, these three are part of a larger sequence of seven that 
can be thought of as relating to the trial and death of Socrates: 
Theaetetus-Euthyphro-Sophist-Statesman-
Apology-Crito-Phaedo 
Theaetetus is the opening salvo of this sequence: in it, Socrates 
discusses the question' 'What is knowledge?" The Sophist falls roughly 
in the middle of the sequence: Socrates first faces the charges against 
him in the Euthyphro, the Apology describes the trial, Socrates refuses 
the opportunity to escape from prison in the Crito, and he makes his 
farewell and drinks the hemlock at the end of the Phaedo. But this 
sequence itself relates back to several earlier dialogues that (so to 
speak) set it up and relates forward to the Timaeus, which deals with 
the nature of the universe. In other words, the Sophist exists within a 
series of expanding groups, rather like Chinese boxes. 
Schleiermacher's Introduction to the Sophist 
Schleiermacher's introduction starts: 
In the Sophist we distinguish at once and at the first glance two 
perfectly separate masses, one of which, distributed into the two 
extremities, starts with the idea of art, and endeavours, by 
12Theaetetus: Eucleides, Terpsion, Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus; Sophist: 
Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus, Eleatic Stranger; Statesman: Socrates, Young Socrates, 
Theodorus, Eleatic Stranger. 
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continuous division and exclusion, to find the nature and true 
explanation of a Sophist; while the other, which forces itself into 
the middle of this . . . speaks of the existent and non-existent 
[i.e., being and not-being]. (246)13 
By "at first glance" Schleiermacher means that he has begun with a 
non-critical reading of the dialogue, merely to observe anything that 
strikes him, and that he could not help noticing this particular 
distinction because of the very different kind of discourse used in these 
two parts (that concerning the sophist, and that concerning being and 
not-being). The opening and closing parts analyze their subject by 
continuous subdivision, whereas the middle part proceeds by linear 
dialectical reasoning. We might represent Schleiermacher's conception 
of the structure diagrammatically as follows: 
Figure 1. Diagram of Schleiermacher's conception of the structure 
L--__ D_e_fi_ill_·U_· o_n_o_f_sO_P_h_is_t _--' _ ~i:n:being _1,-__ · _. _. _S_O_Ph_i_st __ --' 
(What do we mean by "continuous subdivision"? We might take 
the case of hunting. Hunting divides into the hunting of aquatic and 
land-based creatures; land-based hunting divides into the pursuit of wild 
13This and all other translations from Platons Werke are taken from the 1836 Dobson 
edition cited above in n. 10. 
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and tame animals; tame animals into man and other animals 14 and so on 
until we conclude that sophism is a form of hunting, namely the 
hunting of rich and promising youths by flattery! 
Figure 2. Continuous subdivision 
art 
~ 
productive acquisitive 
~ 
exchange hunting 
~ 
aquatIc land-based 
wOe 
1\ 
other man 
~ 
commumty pnvate 
~ 
amatory flattery = sophist 
(gifts) (pay) 
We can see from this example the irony with which Plato spotlights 
sophism: in the course of his characterization he portrays it first as one 
menial occupation then as another-merchandizing, juggling, and so 
on.) 
l~his step is not fully spelled out by Plato. The argumentation occurs at 221E-223B 
of the dialogue. 
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After distinguishing the middle from the opening and closing 
layers 15 of the dialogue, Schleiermacher says that on grounds of 
construction we would assume the outer layer to be the real subject of 
the dialogue and the inner layer (about being and not-being) to be a 
necessary digression to the outer (the definition of a sophist), On the 
other hand, since we learn nothing about the sophist that we have not 
learned in previous dialogues, and since the central debate of being and 
not-being adds to the larger debate in the dialogues as a whole, then we 
may see the outer and inner layers of this dialogue as like a shell and 
a kernel: 16 
Figure 3. Outer and inner layers of the dialogue 
shell kernel shell 
'----__ D_efi_lil_i_tio_ll_O_f_S_OP_hi_' s_t_---' _ ~~n:being _I L-__ ' _ •. _SO_P_hi_st __ --l 
But then Schleiermacher executes a shift. Is not the definition of the 
sophist part of a great trilogy of dialogues in which the philosopher, the 
sophist, and the statesman are in turn described? Surely, then, the 
definition of the sophist must be of at least equal importance to that of 
the inner layer. So, by viewing the Sophist as part of a larger whole, 
he now concludes: 
there is here nothing to be rejected as mere shell, but, . , the 
ISDobson translates them as "masses," 
16Ibid" 247: "shell and setting," 
Bent, Plato-Beethoven 
whole dialogue is like a precious fruit of which a true 
connoisseur is glad to enjoy the 0utward peel at the same time 
with the fruit itself, because grown as the former is into the 
whole, it could not be separated without hurting the pure and 
proper relish of the latter. (249) 
9 
Indeed, the outer layer is not all satire. It contains, for example, one 
argument relevant to the larger framework of Socrates' trial and death, 
namely that the sort of cross-examination for which Socrates is famous 
purges and purifies the mind of inconsistencies and falsehoods, and is, 
contrary to the charges against Socrates, non-subversive (249-50). 
Schleiermacher now shifts back to the parts and whole within the 
Sophist. He turns to the central layer of the dialogue, showing that its 
structure mirrors that of the dialogue as a whole; that is, it comprises 
again an outer shell and an inner kernel: 17 
Figure 4. Outer shell and inner kernel 
shell kernel shell 
L-__ S_p_eec_h_an_d_f_al_se_h_oo_d_ ...... _ ~i:n:being _1L-___ s_p_ee_C_h_"_"_O_----' 
The outer part is a discussion of speech and falsehood; the inner part 
is a necessary digression that reinforces that discussion, on being and 
not-being. What is more, our inner and outer layers are what we might 
call "isomorphic" (to use a modern term), for in each case the outer 
discussion loses its way, and the inner discussion is interpolated so that 
17Ibid., 250: the parts are 236E-241B I 241B-259E I 259E-264C. 
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the outer one can find its footing again (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Outer and inner discussions 
.c () 
Q) 
Q) 
0.. 
CI) 
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Schleiermacher calls the inner-inner kernel (which itself divides into 
two parts18) "the most valuable and precious core of the dialogue," 
where "the most inward sanctuary of philosophy is opened in a purely 
philosophical manner" (251). 
Moreover, the inner' 'layer" of the dialogue refutes several of the 
past schools of Greek philosophy, and Schleiermacher teases these out 
one by one. 19 From this set of external references, Schleiermacher then 
turns to this dialogue's "intimate relation" to two dialogues not 
included in our Socratic sequence, namely the Parmenides and the 
Timaeus. The Parmenides had, in his view, initiated a discussion of 
how "ideas," in their pure form, can be said to exist-a discussion 
which later resumes in "a whole series of successive dialogues from 
the Theaetetus upwards." In the Sophist, in turn, the "foundation" is 
"laid perfectly and dialectically" for the Timaeus (see Figure 6).20 He 
then establishes links with several other dialogues on the basis of 
contenfl and uses these finally to confirm the closer links within its 
own trilogy, Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman. 
18Ibid., 252-53: being, and opposites (represented by rest and motion): 
Schleiermacher indicates 251B-254D i 254D-259E, but it might better be shown as 
241B-250D I 250D-259D. 
19Ibid., 254-59: Parmenides (241Dft), the Ionic philosophers (245Eft), the atomists 
(246Eft), the idealists (248Aft). 
2'1bid., 259-60. On continuity between the Parmenides and Theaetetus onward, see 
ibid., 118, 132 (Parmenides), 198-99 (Theaetetus). In Schleiermacher's chronology (no 
longer accepted), the Meno, Euthydemus, and Cratylus arose between the Theaetetus and 
the Sophist (ibid., 204, 263), so "successive" implicitly includes these. The proposed 
linkage, by its nature, "is intended to be said preliminarily only, " and has remained so, 
since Schleiermacher died before reaching the translation of, and commentary on, the 
Timaeus. 
21Ibid., 261-63: Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Cratylus, Meno, Republic. 
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Figure 6. Sophist as focal point of five dialogues 
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..c (go 
.... 
CIl 
'" 
("""" ~ 0 
t::l... c 
Cl ( .S 
V) .... ( ·2 
<.;:::: 
LJ /I\. 
/I\. 
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This brief glimpse of Schleiermacher at work enables us to 
summarize as follows: 
First, we saw borne out in his introduction to the Sophist what 
Dilthey had signalled in the statement quoted earlier, namely that 
Schleiermacher's method entails an initial exploratory reading-a 
"naive" incursion, we might say, into the text; that the reading process 
then starts all over again at a more detailed level; and that only at this 
second stage does the hermeneutic method proper begin. 
Second, Schleiermacher works always with parts and wholes. He 
seeks to define what is subordinate and what is superordinate-what 
functions within what, and how it so functions. 
Third, in doing this, he often runs into a blank wall, an impasse 
-what hermeneuticists call an aporia. When this happens, he executes 
a shift to a higher or lower level-that is to say, he starts treating as a 
part what has previously been a whole, or vice versa. By shifting levels 
in this way, he can later work his way back to the impasse and find his 
way through it. In so doing, he gradually fills out the picture bit by bit, 
until the totality stands clear before him. 
Fourth, his normal mode of operation is not that of constructing a 
narrative. He doesn't "tell the story" of the dialogue; rather, he 
reflects on the elements of the dialogue. That is not to say that he never 
talks us through a portion of Plato's argument, for he does 
occasionally; but when he does this, it is always in the service of this 
reflective process, never for its own sake. 
This brings us to the fifth point, namely that Schleiermacher works 
with the "message" of Plato's dialogue rather than with its outward 
form or its literary style. The structure that he identifies is a structure 
of meaning, not of external factors. Every text, Schleiermacher 
realized, whatever its language, and however close to or remote from 
our experience, is to some degree "foreign" to us, and thus demands 
to be "understood." Verstand, the capacity to understand, and 
14 Indiana Theory Review Vol. 16 
Verstehen, the act of understanding, are central to hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics treats text as message. Its concern lies with the author's 
intention; its purpose is to facilitate understanding in the reader. 22 
Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics: The Theory 
Although Schleiermacher wrote no book on the theory of 
hermeneutics, he lectured on hermeneutic method at the University of 
Berlin for a quarter of a century, and at his death he left behind his 
lecture notes for that course and other documents. All of these are now 
available in a German edition, and that edition in an English 
translation. 23 
It was Schleiermacher's achievement to create a field of general 
hermeneutics. In the eighteenth century there had existed three separate 
fields: biblical hermeneutics, classical literary hermeneutics, and 
juridical hermeneutics. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, 
Schleiermacher charted out an independent hermeneutics, capable of 
treating these three categories of texts, and in principle all other types 
22The irony of this is Schleiermacher's name, which means literally "maker of 
veils," hence by extension "obfuscator" or "obscurantist." It was Nietzsche who 
commented on this: "On the roll of knowledge the Germans are inscribed with nothing 
but dubious names, all that they have ever produced have been 'unconscious' coiners-
an appellation as appropriate to Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Schleiermacher, 
as it is to Leibnitz, and Kant: they are all obfuscators [Schleiermacher]" (' 'The Case of 
Wagner" [1882], §3, published in Ecce homo [1908]). It is unclear to me whether 
Nietzsche is implying also a propensity of German Idealist philosophers to bear 
unfortunate names: Fichte = "spruce tree"; Kant = slang for "peripheral region"; 
Schopenhauer = "hewer of ?"; Leibnitz = "body net?"; Hegel = ? Elsewhere, 
Nietzsche remarked: "He who has once contracted Hegelism and Sch1eiermacherism is 
never quite cured of them" ("David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer," Untimely 
Meditations, Part I [1873], trans. Reginald John Hollingdale, with an introduction by 
J. P. Stern [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983], 27). 
23Heinz Kimmerle, Hermeneutik, nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben . . . 
(Heidelberg: Karl Winter, 211974), trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman as 
Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts (Missoula, MT: American Academy of 
Religion, 1977; Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1986). 
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of texts as well, but which moreover was applicable also to spoken 
communication. 
General hermeneutics was the field that lay between three other 
established fields of textual interpretation: philology (the study of 
language in and of itself), criticism (the repair of defective texts), and 
exegesis (the expounding of the meaning of individual words and 
phrases within a text). Hermeneutics, then, handled the text as a whole 
and dealt with its meaning as a whole, i.e., its message. Crucial to 
Schleiermacher's approach was his belief that, in all communication, 
misunderstanding was more likely to occur than not. Indeed, while 
thinking appears identical in everyone, Schleiermacher believed 
(contrary to Hegel) that each person thinks in a different language. But 
at the same time, he did not (like Derrida) revel in difference: he held 
that it was essential to strive to transcend difference. 24 
At the heart of Schleiermacher's hermeneutic theory, then, were 
two pairs of opposites: one of these we have already encountered, 
whole versus part; the other is new to us, namely, objective versus 
subjective. As to the first of these, Schleiermacher took a broadly 
organic view of any text: at all levels of construction there is a whole, 
comprised of parts; and this relation applies not only within the organic 
work itself, but also outside (as we saw with the Sophist), to the work 
in relation to other works in its class, to that class in relation to some 
larger class, to some body of knowledge, to a given social context, and 
so forth. As he said, for example: 
The vocabulary and the history of an author's age together form 
a whole from which his writings must be understood as a part, 
and vice versa .... Complete knowledge always involves an 
apparent circle, that each part can be understood only out of the 
whole to which it belongs, and vice versa. (113)25 
24Andrew Bowie: Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1990), 153. 
25 All quotations in this section of the essay are taken from Kimmerle, Hermeneutik, 
nach den Handschriften neu herausgegeben ... , trans. Duke and Forstman as 
Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts. 
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There exists a dialectical relation between whole and parts. The 
hermeneutic principle, he says, 
is that just as the whole is understood from the parts, so the 
parts can be understood only from the whole. This principle is 
of such consequence for hermeneutics and so incontestable that 
one cannot even begin to interpret without using it. (195-96) 
As to the second opposition, that of subjective and objective, 
Schleiermacher tersely observes: 
Analysis of the task . . . proceeds from two entirely different 
points: understanding by reference to the language and 
understanding by reference to the one who speaks. Because of 
this double-character of understanding, interpretation is an art. 
Neither aspect can be completed by itself. (68) 
In this antithesis, "language" corresponds with the objective pole, 
and "the one who speaks" with the subjective. Schleiermacher termed 
them the "grammatical" and "psychological" aspects. In short, he 
meant that the interpreter must approach the message of a text from two 
opposite ends simultaneously: from the linguistic fabric of the 
communication, and from the mind of the writer or speaker. As he 
said: 
understanding . . . always involves two moments: to under-
stand what is said in the context of the language with its 
possibilities, and to understand it as a fact in the thinking of the 
speaker. ... Understanding takes place only in the coinherence 
of these two moments. (98) 
But these two pairs of opposites are unworkable without one 
paramount principle-one overriding strategy-which is the quin-
tessence of hermeneutic procedure: the celebrated hermeneutic circle. 
Take the grammatical and the psychological: When one starts, one has 
neither a complete knowledge of the individual language of the 
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utterance concerned nor a complete knowledge of the psychology of its 
author. Thus, in Schleiermacher's words: 
Since in both cases such complete knowledge is impossible, it 
is necessary to move back and forth between the grammatical 
and psychological sides, and no rules can stipulate exactly how 
to do this. (100) 
This "moving back and forth" suggests a shuttle, and indeed the 
metaphor of a shuttle is almost as common in Schleiermacher as that of 
the circle. For on a loom, a shuttle must be in constant motion, and the 
pattern that it weaves emerges, so to speak, perpendicularly to the 
plane of the shuttle-not in the path of the shuttle, as would be the case 
for many other methods of inquiry. 
The circle or shuttle operates just as constantly on the polarity of 
whole and part. There is a particularly vivid passage that portrays the 
uncertain progress of the interpreter: 
When we consider the task of interpretation with this principle 
in mind, we have to say that our increasing understanding of 
each sentence and of each section, an understanding which we 
achieve by starting at the beginning and moving forward slowly, 
is always provisional. It becomes more complete as we are able 
to see each larger section as a coherent unity. But as soon as we 
turn to a new part we encounter new uncertainties and begin 
again, as it were, in the dim morning light. It is like starting all 
over, except that as we push ahead the new material illumines 
everything we have already treated, until suddenly at the end 
every part is clear and the whole work is visible in sharp and 
definite contours. (198) 
Striking in this graphic description is the absence from its portrayal 
of the hermeneutic circle of any derogatory overtones. The interpreter 
is not "stuck in a loop"; above all, Schleiermacher would never have 
dreamt of depicting it as a "vicious circle," as it came to be called by 
later writers. Far from vicious, the circle or shuttle was for him a 
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wholly productive process; indeed, it was the only way forward. It was 
the means by which the hermeneuticist overcame those impasses of 
which I spoke earlier. The circling gradually brought two separate 
bodies of evidence together until they fused as a single interpretation. 
Circling was thus like the focusing of two separate images into a single, 
three-dimensional image. 
Plato and Beethoven 
Plato's Dialogues have been an object of interest to several 
hermeneuticists, and it is not difficult to see why. For a start, very little 
was known in the early nineteenth century of the order in which the 
Dialogues were written or intended to be read. The physical sources 
offered few clues. The internal evidence within the Dialogues was 
labyrinthine, and any intimations were well concealed. Where no order 
was known, the overall structure of Plato's philosophic argument was 
obscure, hence its very intention cryptic. Hermeneutics, with its 
constant shift between grammar and psychology, form and content, was 
an ideal method for laying siege to that problem. Moreover, there was 
an intrinsic kinship between the hermeneuticist's method and Socrates' 
dialectic, with its patient interrogations, its dramatic impasses, and 
extravagant digressions. It is not surprising, then, that Schleiermacher 
devoted a significant part of his energies to the Dialogues, and that they 
have also been a lifetime preoccupation for Hans Georg Gadamer in the 
present century. 26 
For writers on music in the nineteenth century, the only composer 
who exerted a comparable fascination was Beethoven. His music, too, 
was full of dramatic impasses and extravagant digressions. For 
example, the pounding diminished-seventh and added-sixth chords that 
collapse into a minor-ninth chord before giving way to a novel E-minor 
26See in particular Hans Georg Gadamer, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight 
Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. and with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); also Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Steed & Ward, 1975,2/1989; German 
original, 1960). 
Bent, Plato-Beethoven 19 
lyrical theme in the development section of the "Eroica" Symphony's 
first movement are a veritable aporia in music and stand as a paradigm 
of such impasses in Beethoven's work. The ordering of his musical 
discourse was hard to fathom and the clues were often well concealed. 
Whether it was governed by rational thinking, or whether only by 
impulse, was unclear. In such a situation, hermeneutic method might 
have laid siege to the issue. The question is, Did it? 
E. T. A. Hoffmann's Review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony 
The review published by E. T. A. Hoffmann in 1810 of 
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony stands, of course, as a monument of 
music criticism, unprecedented in its command of technical detail, and 
marked out for its statement on the autonomy of instrumental music and 
for its organic imagery. 
The central concern of this review was to demonstrate the 
composer's control over his material. Hoffmann's remark that "the 
whole work will sweep past many [listeners] like an inspired rhapsody" 
(250)27 was intended to represent the prevailing reaction to Beethoven's 
music in 1810. It was, however, a reaction against which Hoffmann set 
his cap. As he says, "it is usual to regard [Beethoven],s works merely 
as products of a genius who ignores form and discrimination of thought 
and surrenders to his creative fervour and the passing dictates of his 
imagination" (238). Hoffmann made the point even more forcefully 
when he recast parts of this review for inclusion in his Kreisleriana in 
1814-15, saying satirically: 
wise judges, gazing about them with a superior air, assure us 
that we can take their word for it as men of great intellect and 
profound insight: the good Beethoven is by no means lacking in 
wealth and vigour of imagination, but he does not know how to 
control it! There is no question of selection and organisation of 
ideas; following the so-called inspired method, he dashes 
27This and all other quotations in this section of the essay are taken from E. T. A. 
Hoffmann's Musical Writings, ed. Charlton and Clarke, cited above in n. 6. 
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everything down just as the feverish workings of his imagination 
dictate to him at that moment. (98) 
Then Hoffmann retorted tellingly: 
But what if it is only your inadequate understanding which fails 
to grasp the inner coherence of every Beethoven composition? 
What if it is entirely your fault that the composer's language is 
clear to the initiated but not to you . . . ? (98; italics in the 
original) 
It is understanding that is the crux of Hoffmann's concern. It is 
understanding that he seeks to engender by his review. His purpose is 
clear: 
In truth, ... his controlling self [is] detached from the inner 
realm of sounds and rul[es] it in absolute authority .... [O]nly 
the most penetrating study of Beethoven's instrumental music 
can reveal its high level of rational awareness . . . . (98) 
"Rational awareness" translates Besonnenheit, a notion central to the 
review, the opposite pole to genius, and a term that will feature in our 
argument below. 
Hoffmann's review is usually depicted as falling into three parts: an 
introduction, a main part, and a conclusion. In reality, it is 
considerably more complex than this. It operates within six distinct 
orbits. Working from the outer to the inner, these are: (1) instrumental 
music in general, (2) instrumental music from Haydn to Beethoven, (3) 
the Fifth Symphony as a whole, (4) relationships between pairs of its 
movements, (5) each individual movement as a whole, and (6) the flow 
of the music from moment to moment. Any depiction of the structure 
of the review must take into account the movement among these orbits, 
for each orbit is the "whole" of the orbit inside it and/or the "part" 
of the orbit outside it. 
The most striking instance of the shift from part to whole occurs at 
the end of Hoffmann's description of the Scherzo. On reaching the first 
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chord of the Finale, he (Hoffmann) breaks off with the remark, "The 
reviewer has previously mentioned the intensifying effect of extending 
a theme by a few bars, and in order to make this clearer he illustrates 
these extensions together [Ex.]" (247-48). By laying out four versions 
of the opening theme, and then a fifth, in a semi-tabular manner, he 
offers a conspectus of the third movement as a whole; and having done 
this he draws a comparison of the tutti theme of the Scherzo with the 
main theme of the first movement (' 'Just as simple and yet, when it is 
glimpsed behind later passages, just as potent as the theme of the 
opening Allegro is the idea of the minuet's first tutti [Ex.]" [248]). In 
doing the latter, he refers back to a similar point when, after describing 
the first movement, he treated that movement as a whole, identifying 
the forces that bind all parts of the movement-primary ideas, 
secondary ideas, and episodes-together: 
There is no simpler idea than that on which Beethoven has based 
his entire Allegro [Ex.] and one perceives with admiration how 
he was able to relate all the secondary ideas and episodes by 
their rhythmic content to this simple theme, so that they serve 
to reveal more and more facets of the movement's overall 
character, which the theme by itself could only hint at. . . . 
[T]he episodes and constant allusions to the main theme 
demonstrate how the whole movement with all its distinctive 
features was not merely conceived in the imagination but also 
clearly thought through. (244) 
Thus, at the end of the first movement he shifts from the individual 
moment to the movement as a whole; at the end of the Scherzo he 
shifts first from the individual moment to the third movement as a 
whole and then to the first and third movements as a related pair. 
But shifts between part and whole are only one aspect of this 
review. Hoffmann also shifts frequently between what Schleiermacher 
called the "grammatical" and the "psychological." For example, of 
the first movement: 
after an episode again built only on a two-bar phrase taken up 
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alternately by the violins and wind instruments, while the cellos 
playa figure in contrary motion and the double-basses rise, the 
following chords are heard from the whole orchestra: [Ex.]. 
They are sounds that depict the breast, constricted and affrighted 
by presentiments of enormity, struggling for air. But like a 
friendly figure moving through the clouds and shining through 
the darkness of night, a theme now enters that was touched on 
by the horns in E flat major in [m.58]. (241-42) 
The shift from purely technical to emotive (to use Peter Kivy's terms) 
and back again is palpable; indeed, it probably induces queasiness in 
the modern reader. Hoffmann's intention is clear: to attack the passage 
concerned from the two ends-from the short hammered phrases, 
diminished sevenths, heavy texture, then unison diatonic theme that 
constitute the "grammar," and the effect of all this on the listener that 
constitutes the "psychology' '-and to fuse the two in the reader! 
listener's mind. As we heard Schleiermacher say, "Understanding takes 
place only in the coinherence of these two moments." 
As Hoffmann shifts from objective to subjective, he often 
simultaneously moves from orbit to orbit. Take his opening description 
of the Scherzo: The slow movement has, at the psychological level, 
temporarily replaced the "awful phantom" of the first movement by 
"comforting figures." However, at the grammatical level, the constant 
modulations, key-juxtapositions, and chromaticisms have not gone 
away, and so we sense that the first-movement horrors may return at 
any moment. Of the Scherzo he then says: 
The distinctive modulations; the closes on the dominant major, 
its root becoming the tonic of the following bass theme in the 
minor mode; this theme itself, repeatedly extended by a few 
bars at a time: (246) 
-all of these are grammatical points-
it is particularly these features which express so strongly the 
character of Beethoven's music described above, and arouse 
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once more those disquieting presentiments of a magical 
spirit-world with which the Allegro assailed the listener's heart. 
(246) 
-all psychological points-
The theme in C minor, played by cellos and basses alone, turns 
in the third bar towards G minor; the horns then sustain the G 
while violins and violas, together with bassoons in the second 
bar and clarinets in the third, have a four-bar phrase cadencing 
on G .... (246) 
-grammatical again-
The restless yearning inherent in the theme now reaches a level 
of unease that so constricts the breast that only odd fragmented 
sounds escape it. (247) 
-and psychological. 
23 
As Hoffmann intermits the grammatical and psychological, he also 
reaches up out of the orbit of the Scherzo into that of the kinship 
between Allegro and Scherzo on which he will later capitalize at the 
end of the review by speaking of the "relationship which exists 
between the subjects of the two Allegros and the [Scherzo]" (251). At 
the same time, he also moves to the penultimate orbit, that of Haydn, 
Mozart and Beethoven, because his allusion to "the magical 
spirit-world" recalls his earlier reference to the "nocturnal spirit-world 
[in] a purple shimmer" and the "magical quality" that he finds in 
Mozart, and the allusion to "restless yearning" recalls the 
"inexpressible yearning" at that same point; and to the outermost orbit, 
that of instrumental music as a whole, by recalling his references to 
"the realm of the infinite," "an unknown realm," and "that infinite 
yearning which is the essence of romanticism" (238). 
To summarize, then, the hermeneuticist reading that I have given 
Hoffmann's review shows that it begins-after a presumed cursory 
reading-at the level of the largest totality by discussing autonomous 
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instrumental music, and then proceeds to the step-by-step progression 
to Haydn's, Mozart's, and Beethoven's instrumental music, which it 
tracks three times before taking each of the Fifth Symphony's four 
movements in turn. At the end of each movement it moves out to the 
orbit of that movement as a totality, and then (from the second 
movement onwards) on out so as to draw affinities with previous 
movements, concluding with a conspectus of all four movements, and 
a confirmation of his initial hypothesis-that the work "is conceived of 
genius and executed with profound awareness ... " (251). At any time 
in this procedure he may reach out to the remoter orbits to establish 
links that illuminate his interpretation. 
Hoffmann and Schleiermacher 
Having drawn attention to the similarities of procedure and method 
between Friedrich Schleiermacher's introductions to the Dialogues of 
Plato and E. T. A. Hoffmann's review of the Fifth Symphony of 
Beethoven, I should perhaps rest my case at this point. I have shuttled 
between two bodies of material, drawing parallels between them-to a 
limited extent, thus, my method has itself been hermeneutic. To stop 
here would be consistent with my methodological subject matter. But 
the power of erklaren (to explain) over verstehen (to understand) is 
strong. The pull of the positivist method is irresistible. 
If Hoffmann's review is, as I have suggested, hermeneutic in 
method, then since Schleiermacher was the creator of a general 
hermeneutics, and since the latter published the first exemplar of his 
method in 1804, it follows that influence, direct or indirect, must have 
been exerted by the one upon the other. The establishment of lines of 
influence is always difficult, even in those rare cases where there are 
statements on record by those involved (one thinks of Stravinsky, of 
Cage). Without such statements, as in the present instance, the task is 
hazardous. But the attraction of proving the case is seductive. So let me 
at least see how far I can carry out the investigation-though without 
any high hopes of success. 
There is no lack of relevant biographical information. The 
approximate date on which Hoffmann made the acquaintance of 
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Schleiermacher for the first time is known: between June 18 and July 
21, 1807. Even the precise time and place of that meeting is recorded. 28 
The two men met again on December 12, 1807.29 Much later in life, in 
1820, Hoffmann was to defend Schleiermacher against charges of 
corrupting youth, and was admitted as a member of the "Society for 
Anarchy," of which Schleiermacher had been a founder-member since 
1809.30 
Such evidence allows the possibility of influence, to be sure, but 
does not establish it. Any further step will lead me into marshy ground. 
One commentator reports that, on moving to Warsaw in 1804, 
Hoffmann began a lifelong friendship with Julius Eduard Itzig (an 
assistant judge there at the time, and later to become a senior official 
of the Supreme Court in Berlin), and that Itzig made it his business to 
acquaint Hoffmann with the poetry of Tieck and Brentano, the 
philosophy of Fichte, and probably also with the publications of 
Schleiermacher. 31 
Unsubstantiated as this is, I cannot unfortunately place any reliance 
on it. Nonetheless, let me explore its possibilities without giving it 
28E. T. A. Hoffmanns Briefwechsel, ed. Hans von Muller and Friedrich Schnapp, 3 
vols. (Munich: Winkler-Verlag, 1967-69), 1:214 (to Itzig-see n. 31 below): "Yesterday 
I was at Mme Levi's from 7:30 to 8:30, where many people were drinking tea with rum 
and making rational conversation; from 9:30 to 11:30 by invitation at Winzer's, where 
once again many people were drinking rum with tea-I made the acquaintance of 
Bernhardi (has a handsome face), of Schleiermacher, and especially of the composer 
Schneider ... " (first half of the letter destroyed, hence no date). 
29Ibid., 231 (to Theodor Gottlieb von Hippel): "Fichte and Schleiermacher are again 
here, Werner is going back to Berlin" (Zacharias Werner [1768-1823]: childhood friend, 
poet, dramatist). On February 9, 1809, he lunched at the house of senior civil servant 
Lorenz Fuchs and his wife (in Bamberg?), where Schleiermacher was the topic of 
conversation; see E. T. A. Hoffmanns Leben und Werk in Daten und Bildem (Frankfurt 
am Main: Insel, 1968), 169 (presumably a diary entry). 
30Ibid., 298. 
31Ernst von Schenck, E. T. A. Hoffmann: ein Kampf um das BUd des Menschen 
(Berlin: Verlag die Runde, 1939), 139. Itzig (1780-1849): born Isaak Elias Itzig, changed 
first names in 1799, last name to Hitzig in 1809; later Hoffmann's first biographer. 
Schenck offers no evidence for this assertion. 
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credence. lfHitzig did draw Hoffmann's attention to Schleiermacher's 
publications, and if those publications included Plato's Works (two 
large assumptions), then between 1804 and 1807 (when Hoffmann 
returned to Berlin) Hoffmann could have encountered volume 1, 
published in 1804, which included Schleiermacher's introduction to the 
Dialogues as a whole and his individual introductions to the Phaedrus, 
Lysis, Protagoras, and Laches, as well as their translations; volumes 
2 and 3, published in 1805, which contained thirteen more dialogues 
with their introductions, including the Parmenides and the Theaetetus; 
and volume 4, published in 1807, which included four more, including 
the Sophist itself, and the Statesman. In short, any or all of the 
introductions to twenty-one dialogues might have come into Hoffmann's 
hands between 1804 and 1807. And if all of this were the case, he 
might even have encountered volume 5, published in 1809, which 
contained the introductions to and translations of a further eight 
dialogues, before writing his review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony in 
1810. 
However, all of this is idle speculation. None of the external 
evidence has elicited demonstrable influence. To turn now to internal 
evidence is to lead to somewhat firmer ground. There is in fact one 
allusion to Plato's Dialogues in Hoffmann's writings. It occurs in 
Kreisleriana, in a letter from Baron Wallborn to Kapellmeister 
Kreisler: 
Are you not, my dear Sir, a small, strange-looking man, with 
a physiognomy that one could compare in some respects with 
that of Socrates? This was highly praised by Alcibiades because 
the god within it was concealed behind a peculiar mask, yet 
shone forth in brilliant flashes of lightning, bold, graceful, and 
terrible!32 
The reference here, as Charlton has identified, is to the praise of 
Socrates with which Alcibiades begins his speech in the Symposium: 
32Kreisleriana, pt. 2, item 1, ed. Charlton and Clarke, 125, where the allusion is 
identified as to the Symposium, 215A-216D. 
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Look at him! Isn't he just like a statue of Silenus? You know the 
kind of statue I mean; you'll find them in any shop in town. 
It's a Silenus sitting, his flute or his pipes in his hands, and it's 
hollow. It's split right down the middle, and inside it's full of 
tiny statues of the gods. 33 
27 
Could it be through Schleiermacher's introduction and translation that 
Hoffmann came to know this passage? The Symposium appeared in 
volume 4 of Schleiermacher's edition (1807), along with the Sophist 
and the Statesman, where the three are presented as a "trilogy.' ,34 
Moreover, Schleiermacher considered Alcibiades' , 'panegyric' , to 
Socrates "manifestly the crest and crown of the whole dialogue, "35 
such that if Hoffmann had read Schleiermacher's introduction to the 
Symposium, his attention would have been drawn directly to that 
passage. 
We must be careful, however. The section of Kreisleriana in which 
the Wallborn letter appears was written in 1814. Even if we could 
demonstrate that Hoffmann's knowledge of the Symposium came from 
Schleiermacher's edition, we would still not have established a link 
between Schleiermacher and the Fifth Symphony review of 1810. 
There is just one further piece of internal evidence to consider, and 
it takes me to yet another of Plato's Dialogues. The Greek word 
sophrosyne (aw4;>poavvYJ) denotes in one sense "soundness of mind," 
33Plato: Symposium, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett, 1989),65. Woodruff footnotes that "flute" translates aulos, which 
is really a reed instrument. 
34"Der Sophist" appears in vol. 2, pt. 2 (1807), 123-421143-240 
(introduction/translation); "Der Staatsmann," 241-55/256-354; and "Das Gastmahl" 
(literally "The Banquet," i.e., the Symposium), 355-70/371-452. The editorial notes 
appear on pp. 482-99, 500-511, and 512-18, respectively. The reference to "trilogy" is 
on p. 359. In his pursuit of parts and wholes, Schleiermacher interpreted the Symposium 
and the Phaedo (vol. 2, pt. 3 [1809],5-22/23-124) as a dialogue-pair portraying Socrates 
the philosopher, and so considered Sophist-Statesman-(Symposium + Phaedo) a 
"trilogy" that portrayed a philosopher as outwardly mortal and inwardly immortal. 
35Dobson, 27-28. 
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"moderation," and "discretion"; and in a second, related sense 
"moderation in desires," "self-control," "temperance," "chastity," 
and "sobriety. ,,36 Platonic use of the term arises in the Protagoras, 
where, in the sense of "temperance" or "self-control," it figures as 
one virtue among several, others being wisdom, courage, justice, and 
holiness. The term comes to the fore (it is tempting to say "again," 
assuming precedence for the Protagoras) in the Charmides, where it is 
the sole subject of an extensive inquiry. 
In the course of Socrates' dialectical moves within the Charmides, 
sophrosyne changes from being "temperance" to being a "science of 
self" in which one knows "what one knows and does not know," and 
then to being the knowledge of good and evil, the end-product being a 
characteristically Socratic inconclusiveness. But in the course of the 
discussion, the notion that sophrosyne is a superordinate art which rules 
over a lower order of such arts as carpentry, medicine, geometry, 
shoe-making, navigation, or flute-playing is given serious consideration. 
The relevance of these last two paragraphs is that 
Schleiermacher's translation of sophrosyne is Besonnenheit, which 
signifies in modern German first' 'deliberation," "circumspection," 
"thoughtfulness," "discretion," etc.; and second "presence of mind," 
, 'levelheadedness, " "collectedness," etc. 37 Schleiermacher maintains 
this translation consistently throughout the Protagoras and the 
Charmides. 
As I stated earlier, Besonnenheit is a term crucial to Hoffmann's 
argument about the Fifth Symphony-one of two terms that he couples: 
Besonnenheit and Genialitat. Their relationship is encapsulated in 
Hoffmann's closing statement that the work is "conceived of genius 
and executed with profound awareness": dass es genial efjunden, und 
36Henry George Liddell, ed., An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1940), 789. 
37The verb besinnen is "to reflect (on)," "to ponder," "to consider"; its past 
participle besonnen is ' 'prudent, ' , , 'circumspect, ' , , 'sober, " "discreet, " but also 
(perhaps by influence from Besinnung, "reason," "considerateness," etc.) "sensible," 
"considerate. " 
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mit defer Besonnenheit ausgejahrt,38 where these two quintessentially 
nineteenth-century terms39 are shadowed by an equally quintessentially 
eighteenth-century pair, Erfindung and Ausjahrung. If genius presides 
over the process of "invention," then it is rational awareness that 
presides over' 'articulation" of that genius. Genius is here the lower 
order of art, rational awareness the superordinate art. Just as, in 
Charmides, Besonnenheit was the "science of self" (and it is this 
meaning that Schleiermacher picks out in his introduction, emphasizing 
"the complete difference between knowledge and perception with 
reference to its power of making itself its own object' '40), so too in 
Hoffmann's review it governs Beethoven's symphony: "He is 
nevertheless fully the equal of Haydn and Mozart in rational awareness, 
his controlling self detached from the inner realm of sounds and ruling 
it in absolute authority [Er trennt sein Ich von dem innern Reich der 
Tone und gebietet daraber als unumschrankter Herr]. ,,41 Besonnenheit 
and Genialitat are ultimately fused in a single notion, "rational genius 
[die besonnene Genialitat].' ,42 
For a definitive statement of the Socratic position on rationality with 
respect to art, it is to, of all places, the Apology-the dialogue in which 
Socrates defends himself at his trial, is found guilty, and is sentenced 
to death-that we must turn. In search of greater wisdom than his own, 
Socrates goes first to the politicians, then to the poets 
tragic, dithyrambic, and the rest .... So I took up poems over 
38Charlton and Clarke, 251; original in AmZ 12 (1809/10): col. 658 (see n. 6 above 
for full citations). 
39Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (Deutsches Worterbuch [Leipzig: Hirtzel]) cites only 
Goethe and Fichte for Besonnenheit; Klinger, Schiller, and Goethe for besonnen in this 
sense (vol. 1 [1805]); and Goethe, Schiller (1795, 1797), Tieck, and von Humboldt for 
Genialittlt (vol. 4, pt. 1 [1897]). 
4°Dobson, 107. 
41AmZ, 12: cols. 633-34; Charlton and Clarke, 238. 
42Col. 658 = p. 251. 
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which I thought they had taken special pains, and asked them 
what they meant .... Now, I am ashamed to tell you the truth, 
Gentlemen, but still, it must be told. There was hardly anyone 
present who could not give a better account than they of what 
they had themselves produced. So presently I came to realize 
that poets too do not make what they make by wisdom 
[Weisheit], but by a kind of native disposition [Naturgabe] or 
divine inspiration [Eingeistung] , exactly like seers and 
prophets.43 
The German given in square brackets is that of Schleiermacher, whose 
commentary and translation appeared in volume 2 (1805).44 Socrates 
speaks here of sophia ("wisdom"), not of sophrosyne, and 
Schleiermacher thus translates it Weisheit, not Besonnenheit; and 
Schleiermacher translates physei as Naturgabe ("natural gift"), not as 
Genialitiit. The passage is nevertheless useful to our discussion in 
enforcing the separation of rationality from artistic insight, and in 
confirming with caustic clarity the superordinacy of the former over the 
latter. 
This is how far the trail takes me. To summarize: The external 
biographical evidence identifies channels of communication through 
which Hoffmann might have been influenced by Schleiermacher's 
method of interpretation. Internal textual evidence establishes at least 
one certainty: that Hoffmann knew Plato's Symposium, though not 
necessarily before 1814. Finally, Schleiermacher's repeated use of 
Besonnenheit in 1805, and Hoffmann's in 1810, to express remarkably 
similar concepts, is strikingly suggestive. At the same time, I have 
found no instances of direct textual borrowing from, or parallel 
43Apology, 22B-C, quoted from The Dialogues o/Plato, vol. 1, Euthyphro, Apology, 
Crito, Meno, Gorgias, Menexenus, trans. R. E. Allen (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1984), 84. 
44"Des Sokrates Vertheidigung," vol. 1, pt. 2 (1805), 179-229, the passage in 
question being p. 197. The Apology is placed in an appendix ("Anhang zur Ersten 
Abteilung der Werke des Platon"), because of Schleiermacher's doubts about its Platonic 
authenticity. 
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readings with, Plato's Charmides. 
My positivist pursuit of proof has ended inconclusively, without the 
sought-for indisputable link-I was right to hold out no high hope of 
success. 
The lack of textual dependency is all the more disappointing because 
an alternative hypothesis has been on the table since 1977. Peter 
Schnaus, who in his study E. T. A. Hoffmann as Reviewer of Beethoven 
for the "Allgemeine Musikalische Zeitung" conducted an examination 
of Hoffmann's language,45 suggested a parallelism with Jean Paul's 
School for Aesthetics of 1804. Course 3 of the fifteen courses making 
up this work is entitled' 'On Genius," and the second section (§ 12) of 
Course 3 is "Besonnenheit." This section, which briefly discusses 
Plato's own control of genius in the Phaedrus and the Republic, without 
entering into the substance of any of the Dialogues, offers this series of 
metaphors in illustration of Richter's idea: 
[The poet] must simultaneously cast flames upon the least detail 
and apply a thermometer to the flames; he must in the battle 
heat of all his faculties maintain the subtle balance of single 
syllables and must ... lead the stream of his perceptions to the 
debouchement of a rhyme. Inspiration produces only the whole; 
calmness produces the parts. 46 
The passage to which Schnaus draws attention is the following: 
Nun gibt es eine hohere Besonnenheit, die, welche die innere 
Welt seIber entzweit und entzweiteilt in ein Ich und in dessen 
Reich, in einen Schopfer und dessen Welt. Diese gottliche 
Besonnenheit ist so weit von der gemeinen unterschieden wie 
45Peter Schnaus, E. T. A. Hoffmann als Beethoven-Rezensent der Allgemeinen 
Musikalischen Zeitung (Munich and Salzburg: Katzbichler, 1977), 80-83; reported in 
Charlton and Clarke, 18. 
46Vorschule der Aesthetik, trans. Margaret R. Hale as Horn of Oberon: Jean Paul 
Richter's "School for Aesthetics" (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1973), 37. 
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Vernunft von Verstand, eben die Eltern von beiden. 47 
(Then there is a higher reflectiveness which divides and 
separates the inner world itself into two parts, into a self and its 
realm, into a creator and his world. This divine reflectiveness 
is as far from the common kind as reason is from understanding, 
for these are their respective parents.)48 
To this passage there is no single direct parallelism in Hoffmann's 
review, but two phrases perhaps recall it: 
. die hohe Besonnenheit des Meisters . 49 
. Er trennt sein Ich von dem innern Reich der Tone . 50 
( ... high reflectiveness of the master ... 
. . he separates his self from the inner realm of sounds ... ) 
The difficulty that now faces me is pointed up by the fact that 
Schleiermacher's first use of Besonnenheit in his Plato translation, 
within the Protagoras, was published in the very same year as Jean 
Paul's School: 1804. Jean Paul could have taken the word over from 
Schleiermacher; Schleiermacher could have taken it from Jean Paul; or 
their two usages could have come from a common source, or even 
from mutual communication. We may never know; lines of influence 
are liable to become ever more ramified rather than being solved. 
What we can say, for what it is worth, is that Jean Paul refers twice to 
Schleiermacher in the School, and on both occasions in conjunction 
47Schnaus, 81. 
48 Horn of Oberon: Jean Paul Richter's "School for Aesthetics, " trans. Hale, 36. 
49AmZ, 12, col. 634. 
50Ibid., cols. 633-34. 
Bent, Plato-Beethoven 
with Plato, for example: 
The same [that they are exemplary, as are Goethe's Propyliien 
and Wilhelm Meister] is true of the few works by the keen, 
ironical, generous great-great, etc., grandson of Plato, 
Schleiermacher. 51 
33 
However, it is to Schleiermacher's Critique of All Previous Ethics, of 
1803, that Richter refers in a footnote at that point. 
It is time to abandon my positivistic search as hopeless, and finally 
to rest my case. Let me admit the power of verstehen, postulate the 
commonality of purpose and method of Schleiermacher and Hoffmann 
in their two enterprises, and at the same time suggest that the Fifth 
Symphony was a special case in Hoffmann's mind: a work so lofty that 
it prompted a special approach, a special method of treatment. The very 
adoption of the hermeneutic method may itself have been a rhetorical 
device, a means of saying implicitly that Beethoven's symphony needed 
no more defense or justification than did Plato's Dialogues-that while 
interpretation might reveal a clear structure beneath the complex and 
baffling surface, the work was already as unassailable as that 
masterpiece from the fourth century Be. 
51Ibid., 286. 
